On May 1st
2014, China sent the HYSY 981 oil rig to an area inside Vietnam’s Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ). Even though this drilling operation was reasoned on June 8th
2014 by China’s Foreign Ministry as a “continuation of the routine process of
explorations”[1], it
is clear from the neutral point of view that China’s intention lies much
further than economic interest.
According to Vietnam’s
People Newspaper (Nhandan), China had daily deployed from “30 to 137 ships,
including missile destroyers, missile defense, fast attack missile and
submarine-hunting patrol ships, mine scanners and amphibious transport dock, to
protect the [HYSY 981] rig”[2].
In addition, the HYSY 981 rig had moved away from its original drilling
location. At first, the oil rig was at a position 130 nautical miles (nm) from
the coast of Vietnam, 17 nm from Tri Ton Island of the Paracel Archipelago
(which China illegally occupied from Republic of Vietnam in 1974) and 182 nm
from China’s Hainan Island. Then, on May 27th 2014, the HYSY 981 rig
moved eastward 23 nm to a new position over 150 nm from the coast of Vietnam.
On June 10th 2014, Vietnam’s fishery control department also
reported signs of HYSY 981 attempting to move again.
The moving of
the HYSY 981 after such a short amount of time combines with China spending a
huge budget to maintain a large fleet to protect the oil rig has cast doubts on
Beijing’s true intention. The purpose of the oil rig, beside economic interest,
might also be political. In my opinion, there are at least 5 speculations of
what China really intends in this incident, economic gain aside.
Firstly, as
China’s economy has grown more prosperous and powerful, Beijing’s calculations
have changed. China leaders have apparently been convinced that they should
abandon Chinese Ex-President Deng Xiaoping’s precedent of restraint and
conciliation and instead seek to change the SCS status quo in China’s favor.
Its behavior is always to escalate the situation and use its overwhelming power
to enhance China’s claims and strengthen its position.
Secondly, it
might be a test on how Vietnam, ASEAN members, the US, Japan and the world
would react. This incident happened shortly after President Obama’s Asia tour
to further consolidate the US’s Asia Rebalance policy. The US lack of
appropriate intervention would surely encourage China to make similar actions
in the future. In addition, Beijing leaders will certainly learn from these
reactions to plot their next move.
Thirdly, Beijing
leaders want to make a statement that China is serious about its goal to become
a naval superpower. China is showing off not only the military strength of its
South Sea fleet but also China’s new generation of modern submersible oil rigs,
capable of drilling at the deepest parts of the SCS.
Fourthly, China
may be planning to use this oil drilling operation to declare that the Paracel
Archipelago (which China illegally used armed force to occupy from South
Vietnam in 1974) has a 200 nm EEZ and continental shelf of its own. It should
be noted that in China’s official explanation from the Foreign Ministry, China
keep mentioning the distance from the oil rig to Triton Island of the Paracels
instead of Hainan Island. China will use this basis to justify any future
drilling operations within 200 nm of the Paracels in the future. This might
also be an important step towards fulfilling Beijing's overly ambitious 9-dash
line.
And finally, this
oil rig incident can drive away attention from what China are planning to do in
the Spratly Archipelago. China is quietly reclaiming land in Johnson South reef
in the Spratlys, “apparently to build an airstrip” to bolster its military
presence there. Beijing
leaders believe that Vietnam is currently busy focusing on the HYSY 981
incident and will find it hard to shift its attention towards the developments
in the Spratlys.
From my point of
view, it seems likely that at this moment, China’s strategic intrigue in the
SCS has three main objectives. One, it is to further consolidate China’s (illegal)
sovereignty over the Paracels. Two, it is to significantly strengthen China’s human
and military presence in the Spratlys to increase China’s surveillance there
and allow China’s PLA to counter any military retaliation of other claimant
states in case of conflict. Three, China will gradually conduct more unilateral
actions in the SCS in a “salami slicing” way, such as sending oil rigs further
south towards the Spratlys or forming an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)
in the SCS. These objectives serve China’s grand desire to control the entire
SCS, conduicive to China’s path to become a naval superpower and the
realization of President Xi Jinping’s “China Dream”.
Beijing’s intention
to change the status quo of the SCS in China’s favor is evident, and its
neighboring countries in Southeast Asia should anticipate more dangerous
unilateral actions from China in the future. The term “peaceful rise” that
Chinese leaders are trying to convey seems untrue considering Beijing’s deeds.
Son
Nguyen
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