Wednesday, June 18, 2014

Exposing China’s Artificial Islands Plan in the Spratlys

My article originally posted on International Policy Digest
Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, via Associated Press
Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, via Associated Press

On May 2nd 2014, tensions dangerously escalated in the South China Sea (SCS) after China’s HYSY 981 oil rig began its drilling operation in an area within Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf. While the HYSY 981 event has become the focal point of SCS developments at the moment, there are signs of another alarming threat to this region’s peace and stability.
News from various sources shows that China is quietly attempting to build an artificial island upon the Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands. Furthermore, Beijing is also planning similar activities in several other reefs of this archipelago. This is a dangerous intrigue and might give China significant advantages in SCS disputes.
Almost two weeks after the HYSY 981 oil rig started its drilling operation, on May 13th 2014, the Philippines provided images of China’s personnelreclaiming land on Johnson South Reef, clearly to build an aircraft runway. Then, on June 4th 2014, Phil Star quoted Philippines President Benigno Aquino III saying he has received reports of movements by Chinese supply ships near at least two more reefs, Gavin and Cuarteron. According to aconfidential report, China is also doing land reclamation activities in the Hughes and Eldad Reef.
Moreover, Jin Canrong, international relations professor at Renmin University in Beijing even revealed to the South China Morning Post that a proposed expansion of the Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratlys has been submitted to the Chinese central government. The artificial island would be at least double the 44km2 size of the US military base of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The proposed expansion, according to Phil Star, will cost China $5 billion USD and would take 10 years to complete, similar to the construction of a 100,000-ton nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.
Beijing’s intrigue to construct artificial islands in the Spratly Islands is a major step in its plan to boost its military power there. Since 1988, China has illegally occupied at least 9 reefs in this archipelago. For the purpose of military stationing or for other purposes, China has been gradually constructing and expanding artificial structures on those reefs. However, most of the structures built are reef fortresses and supply platforms since the tiny area of those reefs has prevented China from building airstrips or sea ports. Only the Fiery Cross Reef could be considered as a semi artificial island since it has a command headquarters and a helicopter landing pad.
Therefore, even though China’s People Liberation Army (PLA) navy is superior to those of the SCS claimant states, it may have some potential weaknesses and disadvantages in case of conflict in the Spratly Archipelago. The distance from Hainan Island’s Yulin base to the Spratlys is 580 miles, considerably further compared to Vietnam’s Cam Ranh base (250 miles) or the Philippines’ Puerto Princesa base (310 miles). As a result, China may find it more difficult to deploy and maintain a large number of military vessels and aircrafts in the Spratlys than in the Paracels. Moreover, the aircraft handling capability of PLA’s Liaoning carrier is still being tested and the carrier is vulnerable against submarines such as Vietnam’s Kilo class. An artificial island built upon the Fiery Cross Reef could act as a permanent and more effective aircraft carrier in the heart of the SCS.
In a press conference in Beijing on June 6th 2014, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei insisted that China’s action in the Spratlys “has nothing to do with the Philippines.” However, other SCS claimant states have valid grounds to be deeply concerned by China’s ambition to build artificial islands in the Spratly archipelago. If the airstrips in Fiery Cross and Johnson South Reefs are completed, the PLA air force will be able to reach not only all parts of the Spratlys but also China’s neighboring countries in Southeast Asia.
According to the Philippines former National Security Adviser, Roilo Golez, Chinese jets can easily reach the entire Philippines, Vietnam and parts of Malaysia within Fiery Cross’s 1,000-mile radius. Consequently, the national security of these countries will be seriously threatened. Furthermore, a chain of artificial islands in the Spratlys will form a block allowing China to strengthen its air and maritime surveillance in the SCS. Like Roilo Golez said, China will then have a strong incentive to establish an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the SCS, similar to the one in the East China Sea.
China’s plan will also be conducive to its intention to become a naval superpower. Beijing is showing off not only the military capability of PLA but also China’s new generation of modern submersible oil rigs (HYSY 981, under-construction HYSY 982, HYSY 943 and HYSY 944), capable of drilling in most parts of the SCS. There is a possibility that China might adopt an “oil rig salami slicing” strategy: to gradually send oil rigs southward from the Paracels into the waters surrounding Spratly Islands. The construction of airstrips and sea ports in the South Chia Sea, along with more aircraft carriers (China is also building another aircraft carrier,estimated to be completed by 2018) will ensure that in case China sends oil rigs into the region, none of the other SCS claimant states dare to militarily stand against Beijing’s action. Therefore, China can carry out its plan to extract resources in the Spratlys with confidence.
Even the Indonesians may have reasons to be worried. In China’s 2009 nine-dash line submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), the area that China claimed does not include Natuna Islands of Indonesia. However, on March 18th 2014, Commodore Fahru Zaini of the Indonesian navy told Antara News that a new map on Chinese passports encompasses part of the Natuna waters, raising the attention of Indonesian officials. This may be a sign of Beijing’s ambition to expand from the Spratly to further south. Thus, China’s artificial islands plan in the Spratly Archipelago will raise deep concerns from Jakarta. Indonesia’s Natuna Islands and even the Malacca Strait are well within the 1,000 miles radius of the Fiery Cross Reef. Beijing may also want to increase its control from the Malacca Strait towards the South China Sea in order to reduce its seaborne energy supply vulnerability.
From the analysis above, it is obvious that the construction of airstrips and sea ports in this archipelago may give China significant advantages in any SCS dispute. However, it will also be a sign of Beijing violating the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DOC) and trying to change the status quo of the SCS in its favor. Over the past few years, China has made many efforts to persuade the world of its peaceful rise. Yet, on the contrary, Beijing’s actions are seen by its neighbor and the international community as provocative and threatening towards regional peace and stability.
Recently, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Chinese General Wang Guanzhong’s speech aimed to send a message that China is not the one who stirs up trouble and tension in the region. It seems that this message was not well received.
Rather than dismissing the concerns of its neighbors as part of a political conspiracy, China should come to understand how its own actions contribute to the perception of a Chinese threat, as evident in its plan to construct artificial islands in the Spratly Archipelago. Beijing’s message of peaceful rise should be proven in words and deeds accordingly.

Thursday, June 12, 2014

Beijing’s true intention of the HYSY 981 Oil Rig Incident

On May 1st 2014, China sent the HYSY 981 oil rig to an area inside Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Even though this drilling operation was reasoned on June 8th 2014 by China’s Foreign Ministry as a “continuation of the routine process of explorations”[1], it is clear from the neutral point of view that China’s intention lies much further than economic interest. This incident could be seen as a part of China’s unilateral actions in the South China Sea (SCS) in recent years along with the occupation of the Scarborough Reef since June 2012, the official establishment of Sansha Prefecture in July 2012, and the Hainan foreign vessels fishing ban in the SCS at the beginning of 2014.
According to Vietnam’s People Newspaper (Nhandan), China had daily deployed from “30 to 137 ships, including missile destroyers, missile defense, fast attack missile and submarine-hunting patrol ships, mine scanners and amphibious transport dock, to protect the [HYSY 981] rig”[2]. In addition, the HYSY 981 rig had moved away from its original drilling location. At first, the oil rig was at a position 130 nautical miles (nm) from the coast of Vietnam, 17 nm from Tri Ton Island of the Paracel Archipelago (which China illegally occupied from Republic of Vietnam in 1974) and 182 nm from China’s Hainan Island. Then, on May 27th 2014, the HYSY 981 rig moved eastward 23 nm to a new position over 150 nm from the coast of Vietnam. On June 10th 2014, Vietnam’s fishery control department also reported signs of HYSY 981 attempting to move again.  
The moving of the HYSY 981 after such a short amount of time combines with China spending a huge budget to maintain a large fleet to protect the oil rig has cast doubts on Beijing’s true intention. The purpose of the oil rig, beside economic interest, might also be political. In my opinion, there are at least 5 speculations of what China really intends in this incident, economic gain aside.
Firstly, as China’s economy has grown more prosperous and powerful, Beijing’s calculations have changed. China leaders have apparently been convinced that they should abandon Chinese Ex-President Deng Xiaoping’s precedent of restraint and conciliation and instead seek to change the SCS status quo in China’s favor. Its behavior is always to escalate the situation and use its overwhelming power to enhance China’s claims and strengthen its position.
Secondly, it might be a test on how Vietnam, ASEAN members, the US, Japan and the world would react. This incident happened shortly after President Obama’s Asia tour to further consolidate the US’s Asia Rebalance policy. The US lack of appropriate intervention would surely encourage China to make similar actions in the future. In addition, Beijing leaders will certainly learn from these reactions to plot their next move.
Thirdly, Beijing leaders want to make a statement that China is serious about its goal to become a naval superpower. China is showing off not only the military strength of its South Sea fleet but also China’s new generation of modern submersible oil rigs, capable of drilling at the deepest parts of the SCS.              
Fourthly, China may be planning to use this oil drilling operation to declare that the Paracel Archipelago (which China illegally used armed force to occupy from South Vietnam in 1974) has a 200 nm EEZ and continental shelf of its own. It should be noted that in China’s official explanation from the Foreign Ministry, China keep mentioning the distance from the oil rig to Triton Island of the Paracels instead of Hainan Island. China will use this basis to justify any future drilling operations within 200 nm of the Paracels in the future. This might also be an important step towards fulfilling Beijing's overly ambitious 9-dash line.
And finally, this oil rig incident can drive away attention from what China are planning to do in the Spratly Archipelago. China is quietly reclaiming land in Johnson South reef in the Spratlys, “apparently to build an airstrip” to bolster its military presence there. Beijing leaders believe that Vietnam is currently busy focusing on the HYSY 981 incident and will find it hard to shift its attention towards the developments in the Spratlys.
From my point of view, it seems likely that at this moment, China’s strategic intrigue in the SCS has three main objectives. One, it is to further consolidate China’s (illegal) sovereignty over the Paracels. Two, it is to significantly strengthen China’s human and military presence in the Spratlys to increase China’s surveillance there and allow China’s PLA to counter any military retaliation of other claimant states in case of conflict. Three, China will gradually conduct more unilateral actions in the SCS in a “salami slicing” way, such as sending oil rigs further south towards the Spratlys or forming an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the SCS. These objectives serve China’s grand desire to control the entire SCS, conduicive to China’s path to become a naval superpower and the realization of President Xi Jinping’s “China Dream”.
Beijing’s intention to change the status quo of the SCS in China’s favor is evident, and its neighboring countries in Southeast Asia should anticipate more dangerous unilateral actions from China in the future. The term “peaceful rise” that Chinese leaders are trying to convey seems untrue considering Beijing’s deeds.  

Son Nguyen